The State of Utah v. Wayne Jay Soules : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
The State of Utah v. Wayne Jay Soules : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott Keith Wilson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Wesley M. Baden; Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Soules, No. 20000099.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/403
umn u m n ourrvuivit. ^wjr^i, 
DOCUMENT 
Kf-'U BRIEF 
45.9 
DOCKET NO. ^ ° °93Cf 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Case No. 981311-CA 
200000*1T- XT 
WAYNE JAY SOULES, Priority No. 12 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
418 East Main, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 537 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
FILE 
MAR fi 1 ?Of!0 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 981311-CA 
v. : 
WAYNE JAY SOULES, : Priority No. 12 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
418 East Main, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 537 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . ii 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
ARGUMENT 4 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS'CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL CLAIM WAS 
WAIVED BY HIS GUILTY PLEA IS BASED UPON WELL-
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, AND DOES NOT WARRANT 
CERTIORARI REVIEW 4 
CONCLUSION 8 
ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A - State v. Soules, Case No. 981311-CA 
(Utah App. December 30, 1999) 
ADDENDUM B - Transcript (R.131:7-10) 
ADDENDUM C - Transcript (R. 132:9-15) 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
United States v. Webb, 83 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1996) 6, 7 
STATE CASES 
Stateexrel. E.G.T., 808 P. 2d 138(UtahApp. 1991) 6 
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, 984 P.2d 382 8 
State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418 (Utah 1998) 5 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989), quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 
411 U.S. 258 (1973) 5 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v. Soules, Case No. 981311-CA (Utah App. December 30, 1999) 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 46 1,7 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
WAYNE JAY SOULES, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 981311-CA 
Priority No. 12 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does the Petition demonstrate that the court of appeals' application of well-
established precedent to find that defendant's guilty plea constituted a waiver of all non-
jurisdictional defects, including all alleged pre-plea constitutional violations, is 
sufficiently "special and important'' to warrant certiorari review? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. 
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision 
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on 
the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question 
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision 
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; 
or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question 
of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history. Defendant was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine and amphetamine with intent to distribute (enhanced to first degree 
felonies due to prior convictions and proximity to public property), possession of 
marijuana, tampering with evidence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and assault 
(R.32-34). A preliminary hearing was held (R.71), and defendant was bound over on 
all charges (R.62). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence (R.79), which was 
denied by the trial court (R. 132:8). Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of amphetamine 
with the intent to distribute, reduced to second degree felonies (R. 132:15). The 
remaining charges were then dismissed (R. 132:16). As part of the plea, defendant 
2 
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reserved the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress (R. 132:14-
15). Defendant was sentenced to Utah State Prison for a term of l-to-15 years on each 
count, to be served concurrently (R. 115-116). In an unpublished Memorandum 
Decision, the Utah Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed defendant's conviction. 
State v. Soules, Case No. 981311-CA (Utah App. December 30, 1999) (Addendum A). 
Statement of relevant facts. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical 
evidence gathered by police in this case, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause 
to detain him, a detention which led to his arrest and the discovery of the drugs which 
formed the basis for the charges against him (R. 131:5-6). 
At the beginning of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, defendant's 
counsel requested a continuance of the hearing due to a conflict between defendant and 
him (R.131:7-8) (Addendum B). The conflict apparently involved a disagreement over 
whether defendant should accept a plea offer: "There's been a plea offer made in this 
case. I think it's in his interest to accept the plea offer. He refuses." Id. 
Defendant addressed the court personally, complaining that his counsel had not 
given him enough information about the applicable law. Defendant did not request 
substitution of counsel, asserting only that "if [counsel] feels he can't do this or that 
there is too big of a conflict between me and him, I would like to maybe get a new 
lawyer" (R. 131:9). The court responded by stating that no adequate grounds had been 
3 
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given for substitution of counsel, and denied the request to continue the suppression 
hearing (R. 131:9-10). 
Defendant later accepted a plea offer. At the change of plea hearing, the court 
asked defendant a series of questions about his relationship with counsel, and defendant 
informed the court that he had been able to fully discuss the issues with counsel and felt 
confident and comfortable with his counsel's advice (R. 132:9-10) (Addendum C). In 
changing his plea, defendant reserved only his right to appeal the court's ruling on his 
motion to suppress (R. 132:13-15). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL CLAIM WAS 
WAIVED BY HIS GUILTY PLEA IS BASED UPON WELL-
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, AND DOES NOT WARRANT 
CERTIORARI REVIEW 
In support of his petition for a writ of certiorari, defendant challenges the court 
of appeals' ruling that his guilty plea operated to waive his claim that the trial court 
erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel, and argues that this issue is one of first 
impression in Utah. Petition, p. 7. To the contrary, the court of appeals' decision 
correctly applied well-established precedent which holds that a guilty plea operates as a 
waiver of all non-jurisdictional claims of error. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. Defendant's guilty plea was entered without reservation of any issue other than 
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Under established precedent, 
defendant's plea constitutes a waiver of all other claims of error in the trial court's 
rulings prior to the plea. 
4
 [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has 
preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has 
solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense 
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 
prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary 
and intelligent character of the guilty plea. 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989), quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258, 267, (1973). The court of appeals noted that defendant never asserted that 
his guilty plea was anything other than voluntary and intelligent, and held that the issue 
of whether the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel was waived by 
defendant's guilty plea. 
This waiver rule is well-established. "The general rule applicable in criminal 
proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is 
deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby 
waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (citing cases); see also State v. Munson, 972 
P.2d 418, 420 (Utah 1998) ("a knowing and voluntary guilty plea precludes reservation 
of issues for appeal, even those concerning alleged pre-plea constitutional violations."); 
5 
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State ex rel. E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah App. 1991) (in order to raise a claim of 
constitutional defects in pre-plea proceedings, "petitioner would only be entitled to 
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea to show that the advice 
he received from counsel in entering the plea did not meet the appropriate standards."). 
In support of his petition for review, defendant does not argue that the issue 
raised is of particular significance, asserting only that the application of the waiver rule 
to the facts of this case is an issue of first impression. Petition, p. 7. In order to make 
this assertion, however, defendant characterizes the issue raised by this case in a very 
limited manner; i.e., "whether, when a defendant enters a Sery plea reserving the right 
to appeal the outcome of a suppression hearing, he waives the right to appeal issues : 
concerning the manner in which the court conducted the hearing," citing United States 
v. Webb, 83 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1996). In Webb, the Seventh Circuit found that a 
defendant's reservation of his right to appeal a suppression ruling included the right to 
challenge the trial court's conduct of the suppression hearing itself, in which defendant 
alleged that the trial judge improperly questioned the witnesses himself. Webb, 83 F.3d 
at917. 
The Webb ruling at most represents a minor corollary to the general rule of 
waiver, and the court of appeals implicitly found that the specific application of the 
waiver rule in Webb did not alter the analysis in this case. Indeed, the court in Webb 
did not consider itself to be announcing a new rule, and dealt with the waiver issue in 
6 
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two sentences, without citation to other case law, simply as an application of the 
general waiver rule to the particular facts of that case. Webb, 83 F.3d at 917. The 
court of appeal's implicit finding that Webb is inapplicable to the specific facts of this 
case is not the sort of "important question" of law that needs to be established by this 
Court on certiorari review. 
A writ of certiorari "will be granted only for special and important reasons." 
Utah R. App. P. 46. Defendant's petition presents no question of constitutional 
moment, no question of statutory interpretation, no conflict among panels, no departure 
from settled law, no call to revisit an obsolescent rule, and no question of major 
impact. The unanimous memorandum decision of the court of appeals simply applies a 
well-settled waiver rule to the specific facts of this case, and has no continuing impor-
tance beyond this case. 
Further, even if the analysis employed by the court in Webb were viewed as 
significant extension of the general waiver rule, this Court's consideration of the 
appropriateness of adopting that rule would not affect the outcome in this case. 
Defendant does not challenge any rulings of the trial court in conducting the 
suppression hearing itself, as was the case in Webb. The court of appeals was therefore 
correct in finding that defendant's reservation of the right to appeal the trial court's 
suppression ruling did not also reserve for appeal the entirely separate issue of whether 
substitute counsel should have been appointed. 
7 
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. Finally, even if it were determined that the court of appeals erred in finding 
that this issue was waived by defendant's plea, the trial court did not err in failing to 
appoint substitute counsel. Both defendant and his counsel were given a full 
opportunity to discuss their disagreement over whether defendant should accept a plea 
offer, and the court properly found that such disagreement did not rise to a level 
requiring appointment of substitute counsel (R. 131:7-10). The later plea colloquy in 
which defendant asserted satisfaction with his ability to discuss the issues with counsel 
confirms the fact that no conflict existed between them (R. 132:9-10). See State v. 
Lovell, 1999 UT 40,1 f 27-35, 984 P.2d 382. 
This Court should not grant certiorari to review whether the court of appeals 
properly applied the uncontested waiver rule to the specific facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the writ should not issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ J _ day of March, 2000 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Counsel for Defendant/Petitioner 
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DEC 3 01999 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ' ^ § i w ^ 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981311-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 30, 1999) 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wayne Jay Soules, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Eighth District, Vernal Department 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
^Attorneys: Wesley M. Baden, Vernal, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Scott Keith Wilson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
1999 UT App 391 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Soules appeals from guilty pleas to one count of possession 
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to 
distribute, and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, amphetamine, with intent to distribute. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1999). Soules entered a conditional guilty 
plea, expressly reserving the right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. See State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 938-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). He now argues (1) the 
trial court erred when it denied him substitute appointed counsel 
and (2) the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact 
when it denied his motion to suppress. We affirm. 
By pleading guilty, Soules waived all nonjurisdictional 
defects, "including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); accord James 
v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Examples 
of such nonjurisdictional issues that may be waived by a guilty 
plea ' involve [] . . . a number of important rights, including the 
right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and 
the privilege against self-incrimination.1" James, 965 P.2d at 
571 (alterations in original) (quoting Salazar v. Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993)). Soules does not 
challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. 
Further, he does not argue that his challenge is based on a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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jurisdictional defect.1 Thus, we will not address his contention 
that the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel. 
Soules next argues the trial court's findings of fact were 
insufficiently detailed to support its denial of Soules1s motion 
to suppress. When findings of fact on a particular issue do not 
appear on the record, ,Mwe "assume that the trier of [the] facts 
found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the 
decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find 
facts to support it."1" State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224 
(Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted)). 
In this case, Soules's parole officer had the authority to 
ask Soules questions. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 
432, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1144 (1984) (stating "the nature of 
probation is such that probationers should expect to be 
questioned on a wide range of topics relating to their past 
^criminality").2 The parole officer asked Soules whether he had 
*been using drugs, and Soules admitted that he had. This 
admission gave the parole officer the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to perform a warrantless search. See State v. Davis, 
965 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). We thus conclude the 
trial court correctly denied Soulesfs motion to suppress. 
Accordingly, we affirm Soulesfs convictions, 
Norman H. Jacksoj^ Judge -&. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Instead, he merely asserts that if the alleged error were 
jurisdictional, it could not be waived. We agree. However, 
Soules has not cited any legal authority to indicate that this is 
the case. 
2. When evaluating searches of probationers and parolees similar 
considerations typically apply to each group. See State v. 
Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 529 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing 4 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.10(c), at 767-69 (3d ed. 
1996)). 
981311-CA 2 
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DAVIS, Judge (concurring): 
The warrantless search conducted by the parole officer had 
little, if anything, to do with the charges to which defendant 
entered his Sery plea. See State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938-40 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). The drugs which were the subject matter of 
the charges resulting in the plea were discovered while defendant 
was booked into jail. 
Based on defendant's involvement in the assault and his 
admission to his parole officer that he had been using drugs, the 
parole officer was justified in taking defendant into custody "on 
a 72 hour hold," and it is well settled that contraband 
discovered during the booking process is admissible. See State 
v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding, 
"piece of glass taken from defendant's pocket as part of an 
inventory search during booking was legally seized, and was 
prqpelTLy Admitted as evidence,") (citation omitted). 
^. lZ,rfc&* James JL'. Davisr"'w'1 '^f',s ^ 
/ 
(/ 
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1 Your Honor. And I produced it on the understanding 
2 that there would be an order from the court that the 
3 document be sealed if it's offered into evidence. I 
4 don't intend to offer it into evidence. 
5 MR. LUNNEN: We can stipulate, I think, to 
6 the time. 
7 THE COURT: If you want to offer it we'll 
8 seal it. Okay? 
9 MR. LUNNEN: Now, I know you will. All the. 
10 witnesses are here. I have done some research on this 
11 case. And I want to put a few things on the record. 
12 And Mr. Soules can respond if he would like to. I 
13 have told Mr. Soules, I have advised him that there is 
14 no legal issue of probable cause. I have done the 
15 research on it. I have looked at the facts. In my 
16 mind, as his counselor, I have advised him there is no 
17 issue of probable cause. We disagree to that. I 
18 think we still disagree. He believes there is an 
19 issue. The case law that I have looked at indicates 
20 to me that there is not an issue. I am concerned that 
21 Mr. Soules and I have pretty hefty conflict because we 
22 don't agree about anything. He's upset with me. I am 
23 frustrated with him because we just are completely at 
24 odds. The reason I am bringing this up is I like 
25 to -- and I realize all the witnesses are here -- I 
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1 would like to ask for a continuance that he either be 
2 allowed to obtain another attorney or that I have a 
3 chance to go over this some more with him. I have 
4 talked to him several times about this issue. I think 
5 "• it's against his best interest. There's been a plea 
6 offer made in this case. I think it's in his interest 
7 to accept the plea offer. He refuses. And I feel 
8 ethically bound to at least put it on the record that 
9 in my mind there is no issue of probable cause. And I 
10 just want it on the record, Your Honor. 
11 Wayne may want to say some things. 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I would like to speak.
 m 
13 •• Mr. Lunnen has seen me three times. I am facing three 
14 five to life's. I feel this is a pretty big, pretty 
15 important part of my case. I have more stuff that I * 
16 want to show him and present my case to him. I have 
17 told --he told me he would be in here to see me every 
18 day this week to prepare for this. I have not seen 
19 him. I have not been able to talk to him on the 
20 phone. The first time I talked to him was this 
21 morning in passing. And I still got more stuff that I 
22 want to show him and present to him. And I ain't even 
23 had a chance to present it to him. He's made the 
24 comment to me that he has 240 active cases, that he 
25 don't have the time to teach me the law. I am not 
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1 asking him to teach me the law. I am just asking him 
2 to teach me a little bit about my case. That way I 
3 could go in this with my eyes open. I mean, three 
4 five to life's. It's pretty big charges. And I would 
5 like to know what I am getting myself into before I 
6 take a plea bargain. And I would like to know some 
7 case law# some case history, something to help me in 
8 my mind believe that this is in my best interest. 
9 I do feel there is some legitimate points in 
10 my case. And I would like some -- I would like some 
11 case law. I have asked him, and I have asked through 
12 the jail, I have requested case law numerous amounts 
13 of times, and they have told me that I had to go 
14 through the County Attorney's Office and through my 
15 lawyer. I can't -- I ain't been able to get it yet. 
16 I am fighting for everything I got here. I mean, 
17 three five to life's is pretty steep. So I still 
18 think there is more that I need to present to 
19 Mr. Lunnen. If he feels he can't do this or that 
20 there is too big of a conflict between me and him, I 
21 would like to maybe get a new lawyer. But that's all 
22 I got to say. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. At this point in time, 
24 there are, sometimes, conflicts between the court --
25 or counsel and the client. In this case, though, if 
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1 Mr. Lunnen has a duty to proceed to represent your 
2 interests, but the fact that you are not happy with 
3 how he's proceeding, isn't grounds to get a new 
4 attorney involved at this point. 
5 This is a suppression motion. Mr. Lunnen has 
€ made a record indicating that he doesn't think 
7 probable cause is an issue. But I guess he's got a 
8 duty to proceed. And we'll make a record if he wants 
9 to supplement the probable cause hearing with a 
10 record, and he can develop his motion. Fine. My 
11 interest here is in protecting your rights and getting 
12 this matter set for trial. Are you incarcerated 
13 waiting trial in this matter? 
• • • • • - • • • 
14 MR. LUNNEN: Yes, he is, Your Honor. 
15 • THE COURT: Are you on parole hold or any 
16 other reason? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am on parole hold. 
18 THE COURT: We are here today. Let's develop 
19 the record with what evidence Mr. Soules thinks would 
20 be appropriate. And I'll -- we'll hear the motion. 
21 My interest, though, is to set the matter for trial if 
22 the motion is not warranted. Or even if it is, that 
23 won't, you know -- and you'll have enough time to 
24 prepare your case. This isn't the trial here today. 
25 In fact, I can't give you a trial date for a long 
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1 likelihood would be looking at three to four years on 
2 the second degree felony minimum until the Board of 
3 Pardons decided to put you on parole. Ifm not telling 
4 you I'll send you to prison. But I am telling you 
5 that you are looking at that as a maximum in the event 
6 I don't give you probation. You also have, 
7 apparently, you are on probation and the entry of this 
8 plea here today will -- are you on probation or 
9 parole? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Parole. 
11 THE COURT: The fact that you are on parole, 
12 the entry of this plea will affect, may affect your 
13 status parole, and you may have to go back anyway. I 
14 want you to know that going in. Do you understand 
15 that? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Knowing that those are the 
18 risks, do you think it's in your best interest to 
19 proceed in this manner or to go ahead and go to trial? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: I think this is in my best 
21 interest. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Have you had time to weigh 
23 the options,and take enough time with Mr. Lunnen to 
24 ,weigh what you are doing and make an intelligent 
25 choice about your options? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
2 THE COURT: Are you -- has he advised you? 
3 Do you feel confident, comfortable with his advice? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
5 MR. LUNNEN: Not always, but --
6 THE COURT: Well --
7 THE DEFENDANT: What this (inaudible). 
8 MR. LUNNEN: We have discussed this ad 
9 nauseam. We have gone over this case many, many times 
10 together. 
11 THE COURT: I am asking him. 
12 THE DEFENDANT: We do butt heads a lot. But, 
13 yeah,. I do believe this is in my best interest. 
14 THE COURT: Factual basis? 
15 MR. LUNNEN: What happened was, when they got 
16 down to the jail, he was being searched and had some 
17 bags with methamphetamine and, I think, also some 
18 marijuana concealed in his pants and, actually, in his 
19 rectal area, I think. They were pulled out and 
20 discovered at that point and thrown across the room. 
21 There was a little scuffle that took place and that's 
22 where they were found. 
23 THE COURT: Count Three talks about 
24 amphetamines. 
25 MR. LUNNEN: Same thing. It's just a 
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1 different --
2 THE COURT: Count One talks about marijuana. 
3 There were two substances. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: There was a joint and crank# 
5 methamphetamine. I had no clue that I had 
6 amphetamine. I was charged with methamphetamine and 
7 amphetamine. Frankly, the difference, I didn't even 
8 know that there was a difference. I didn't even know 
9 I had two different substances. I thought it was --
10 and my understanding it was all one substance, was all 
11 the same stuff. 
12 MR. LUNNEN: It was later determined through 
13 testing that one was amphetamine, apparently. It's a 
14 lesser of a pure, I guess. 
15 THE COURT: One is just a salt of the other. 
16 MR. WALLENTINE: It is, Your Honor. There 
17 are two refinement processes, different methods of 
18 manufacturing. 
19 THE COURT: How did you get to the 
20 distribution quantity in the marijuana? 
21 MR. LUNNEN: That's not one of the ones that 
22 he's pleading to. 
23 MR. WALLENTINE: No. It's the amphetamine 
24 and methamphetamine. There were 2.5 grams of 
25 amphetamine, 1.3 grams of methamphetamine packaged 
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1 together. 
2 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Count One is 
3 methamphetamine. Count 3 is amphetamine. Okay. 
4 MR. WALLENTINE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: I misread that. All right. They 
6 were packaged separately? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. You are, except for the 
9 issue you are preserving on appeal you are waiving all 
10 of your defenses and all your rights, including a 
11 right to pick a jury and go to trial on that. Do you 
12 understand that? 
13 ; THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. There is an affidavit on 
15 the podium that sets forth all of your rights. Have 
16 you read that? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: I have read it and signed it. 
18 THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
20 THE COURT: Have you asked Mr. Lunnen any 
21 questions about it? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. And he's 
23 answered them all thoroughly. 
24 THE COURT: Any other questions. 
25 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. You need make a motion 
2 through him to withdraw this plea within 30 days or I 
3 won't consider it. Go ahead and sign it if you are 
4 satisfied. 
5 MR. LUNNEN: He's already signed it, but I am 
6 having him sign it again. 
7 THE COURT: That's okay. Did you sign it 
8 here? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did# .just now. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that. Do you 
11 have any questions of me? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: I just -- I would like to ask 
13 you something. 
14 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I'm on parole anyway, so I am 
16 going back to prison when I am found guilty of these 
17 charges. I just ask --
18 MR. LUNNEN: He doesn't want to know about 
19 sentencing yet. I think he wants to know if you have 
20 any questions about this. 
21 THE COURT: I'll let him talk to me later 
22 about that. But for right now, do you have any 
23 questions about what's happening and what you are 
24 doing? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Just that I do - preserving 
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•1 my right to appeal of evidentiary hearing and the 
2 process the cops went about, because I honestly feel 
3 there is big gaps that the cops -- I mean, on the 
4 stand and all their different transcripts, there is a 
5 bunch of lies -- well, maybe not lies, but they 
6 proceeded differently than any other report they have 
7 ever given, they proceeded differently. So I feel 
8 there is a bunch of obscurities there that they have 
9 done. 
10 THE COURT: And your right to appeal --
11 THE DEFENDANT: (inaudible) 
12 THE COURT: --on this how they found the 
13 evidence and your detention and so forth will be 
14 preserved. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: All right. 
16 THE COURT: That doesn't mean that -- I have 
17 already ruled on those against you. 
18 THE DEFENDANT: I know. I feel you haven't 
19 heard all the evidence, though. 
20 MR. LUNNEN: That's why you are preserving -
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Now, any other defenses, your 
23 right to go to trial, pick a jury, you understand you 
24 are giving up those rights? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. Also, I 
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1 understand that if I do beat on that right for appeal 
2 that all of this is void, then I get to go back 
3 through the process again, right? 
4 THE COURT: If the Court of Appeals reverses 
5 me and says that the evidence should have been 
6 suppressed, they will likely either discharge you, 
7 dismiss the matter, or order a new trial. Then you'll 
8 come back to a new trial and the state won't have the 
9 evidence, and then we'll see what happens. You may 
10 have to go -- you may have to have a trial again. You 
11 know, you may have to post a bond while you are in 
12 trial. Any questions about that? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
14 -THE COURT: Okay. To the charge contained in 
15 Count One, second amended information, possession of 
16 controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
17 second degree felony, on or about September 28th, 
18 1997, what is your plea? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
20 THE COURT: To Count Three, possession of a 
21 controlled substance with intent to distribute a 
22 second degree felony, same date, different substance, 
23 amphetamine, what is your plea? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
25 THE COURT: The court will accept the pleas, 
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